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The Structure of Human Memory
The overall purpose of this article is to provide an
analysis of the structure of human memory. We will focus
primarily on the process of recall of information from long-term
memory.
In the first section of the paper we examine a hypothetical
episode in the life of an undergraduate. The episode is intended
to provide a clear example of personal memory, a type of memory
rarely studied in experimental psychology. It also shows how one
episode can give rise to three different forms of memory:
personal memory, semantic memory, and rote linguistic skill.
In the second section we develop a "botany" of important
naturally occurring forms of memory. We make an explicit
methodological commitment to use the phenomenal reports of
subjects as one major class of evidence in our analysis. Our
description reveals six important types of memory: personal
memory, semantic memory, generic perceptual memory, motor skill,
cognitive skill, and rote linguistic skill. We contrast this
description with the traditional distinction between episodic and
semantic memory. We conclude that the term episodic memory, as
it is currently used, includes two very different forms of
memory-personal memory and skill.
In the third section we provide a more analytic approach to
the structure of human memory. We decompose the important
naturally occurring types of memory and attempt to construct a
table of the logically possible types of human memory. This
analysis organizes human memory in terms of the types of inputs
and types of acquisition conditions, and proposes an account of
the possible forms of memory representation in terms of the
intersections of these two factors. A systematic attempt is made
to examine both imaginal and nonimaginal forms of representation
for each form of memory. The analysis captures a wide variety of
types of memory and the forms of representation postulated to
underlie each type.
In the final section we relate the initial botany of memory
to our more analytic classification scheme. We discuss the
mental processes involved in transferring information from
procedural memory to semantic memory. We point out the
complexity that can arise from our assumptions about multiple
forms of representations and finally we discuss the problem of
the veridicality of mental images.
AN EXAMPLE
The analysis of memory outlined in this article is quite
different from most current approaches in psychology, and so to
display some of the differences, we will work through a concrete
example illustrating three of the basic forms of memory that will
occur in our treatment.
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The Episode
Consider the following event: A University of Illinois
undergraduate comes in the side door of the Psychology Building.
He takes the elevator to the fourth floor. He pulls a slip of
paper out of his pocket, checks the room number, and walks down
the corridor to the experimental room. He hesitates a minute,
knocks on the door, and goes inside. He sees the experimenter
standing behind a table that contains a memory drum. He sits
down and is given 20 trials of practice on a long paired-
associate list. One of the items on the list is the pair DAX-
FRIGID. After the experiment is over, he gets up, gives a sigh
of relief, and leaves the experimental room.
Three Types of Memory
This episode can be used to illustrate how the same event
can lead to the development of three forms of memory: personal
memory, semantic memory, and rote linguistic skill.
Personal Memory
If, the next day, we were to ask this undergraduate, "Do you
remember the psychology experiment you were in yesterday?" he
might say something like: "Sure, I remember coming in the side
door on Sixth Street. I turned to the right and took the
elevator up. It was my first experiment. I couldn't remember
the room number so I had to check my experiment notice. I
remember feeling nervous as I stood there in front of the door.
I remember opening the door and seeing the experimenter standing
behind the table. I remember being surprised that the
experimenter was a woman. She had a white laboratory coat on,
etc." If we asked the undergraduate, "Was anything going through
your mind while you were telling us about the experiment?" he
would probably say something like: "Yes, as I was recalling the
information I could see in my mind's eye much of what I told you.
I could see the door on Sixth Street. I could see the expression
on the experimenter's face when I opened the door." It is this
type of memory that will be called personal memory in this paper.
Semantic Memory
If, some months later, we were to ask this undergraduate,
"Do you remember what psychology experiments you were in last
semester?" he might say, "Sure, there was a verbal learning
experiment, a perception experiment, and two social psychology
experiments." If we asked him, "Was anything going through your
mind when you told me you were in the verbal learning
experiment?" he would probably say something like: "No, I just
know that there were four experiments and one of them was a
verbal learning experiment. Now that we are talking about it, I
can see the experimenter in her white coat standing behind the
table, but nothing like that was happening when I answered your
question." His initial recall is an example of the type of
memory that we will call semantic memory.
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Rote Linguistic Skill
We can illustrate the third form of memory by asking our
undergraduate to perform the following task: "I am going to give
you a series of nonsense syllables from that experiment you were
in several days ago, and when I give you a nonsense syllable I
want you to tell me the word that was paired with it." We then
give the undergraduate a series of items from the experimental
list including the item DAX. When presented with the nonsense
syllable DAX, our undergraduate says "FRIGID." If we ask him,
"Was anything going through your mind when you gave the response
'FRIGID'?" he might say something like: "No, I had been over
that blasted list so many times that I was able to say it as soon
as you showed me the stimulus." This type of memory is rote
linguistic skill.
Strategy of the Paper
The purpose of the description of the visit to the
psychology lab has been to provide a detailed example of some of
the types of memory that will be discussed later in the paper.
However, it also illustrates two general strategies adopted
throughout this chapter. We are looking for naturally occurring
categories of memory phenomena, and we take the phenomenal
reports of subjects as one important class of data to be used in
the study of human memory.
Data from Phenomenal Reports
In the last decade there has been a growing acceptance of
the position that reports of phenomenal experience can be used in
scientific psychology (Ericsson & Simon, 1980; Hilgard, 1980;
Natsoulas, 1970, 1974; Radford, 1974). The general line of
argument is that phenomenal reports are as acceptable as any
other type of data. As long as the data from phenomenal reports
enters into lawful relations with other data, and as long as
theoretical constructs derived from phenomenal experience
interact in a meaningful fashion with other theoretical
constructs, there is no reason to exclude them from scientific
psychology. We agree with these arguments derived from
philosophy of science and from methodological considerations, but
we wish to push the issue one step farther. We take the position
that a complete scientific psychology must be able to account for
the data from phenomenal experience and that an information-
processing account of the mind that excluded the data from
phenomenal experience would be an incomplete science (see Block,
1980; Shoemaker, 1980, for a similar line of argument in
philosophy).
It also seems to us that there has been some divergence
between the acceptance of phenomenal reports in theory and the
actual use of them in practice. Even though cognitive psychology
is considered to be a mentalistic psychology, the focus on
unconscious mental processes within the information-processing
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tradition has led to remarkably little serious use of data from
phenomenal experience (see Dulany, 1968, for an early
counterexample). This avoidance of data from phenomenal
experience is very pervasive. Our analysis in this article of
some recent experiments by the senior author relies on
unsystematic phenomenal reports made by the subjects after the
formal experiment was over. Clearly, in the course of gathering
the data in those experiments the phenomenal report data were not
considered to have the same scientific status as the data on the
number of correct responses in recall.
Recently we have initiated a series of experiments
explicitly designed to gather phenomenal reports during a variety
of recall tasks (Brewer & Pani, 1982, 1983b). The basic
methodology is to ask subjects a memory question (e.g., "What is
the opposite of false?" or "Which is farther south, the tip of
Texas or the tip of Florida?") and then request descriptions of
their mental experience during recall.
A BOTANY OF MEMORY
Purpose
In this section of the article we take an explicitly
morphological approach to human memory. We want to find the
common forms of human memory and provide careful descriptions of
them, much as a biologist might describe the obvious species
occurring on a newly discovered island. In this section we will
not discuss how the types of memory might have developed or what
mechanisms might underlie their operation.
This approach is rarely taken by experimental psychologists
and so to help inform our observations we have explored a number
of literatures outside of current cognitive psychology. The
particular description of memory that we outline below has been
most strongly influenced by: (a) our own introspections; (b) the
work of philosophers on memory (e.g., Bergson, 1911; Furlong,
1951; von Leyden, 1961; Locke, 1971; Malcolm, 1963; and Russell,
1921); (c) the early research of introspective psychology (e.g.,
Crosland, 1921; Kuhlmann, 1907, 1907, 1909; Titchener, 1910); and
(d) current cognitive psychology (Neisser, 1976; Norman, 1976;
and Tulving, 1972).
We consider our proposed classification to be tentative.
One reason for this is that we do not have systematically
obtained phenomenal reports concerning memory, and therefore we
have had to rely on our own and others' unsystematic
observations.
Six Types of Memory
We will now turn to the botany of memory and describe six
types of human memory. Table 1 gives examples of questions
intended to elicit these six types of memory.
-- ------ --
Insert Table 1 about here.
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Personal Memory
A personal memory is a recollection of a particular episode
from an individual's past. Personal memory seems always to be
experienced in terms of some type of mental imagery-
predominantly visual, since vision is the dominant sense (e.g.,
"I could see the expression on the experimenter's face," in the
above example). Personal memory includes some nonimaginal
information also (in the above example: "It was my first
psychology experiment"). The memory is experienced as the
representation of a particular time and location. Indeed, it
often seems to be a kind of "reliving." In the case of time,
this does not mean that the individual can assign an actual date
to the memory, just that it is experienced as having been a
unique time. For location, the ability to actually recall a
particular place seems much stronger, but data are needed here.
The personal memory episode is accompanied by a propositional
attitude (cf., Fodor, 1978) that "this episode occurred in the
past." A personal memory is accompanied by a belief that the
remembered episode was personally experienced by the individual
(thus the term "personal memory"). A personal memory is also
frequently accompanied by a belief that it is a veridical record
of the original episode. This is not to say that personal
memories are veridical, just that they are frequently believed to
be. We will discuss the veridicality issue later in the article.
Generic Memory
A generic memory is the recall of some item of the
individual's general knowledge. Generic memory is not
experienced as having occurred at a particular time and location.
Two important forms of generic memory are semantic memory and
perceptual memory.
Semantic memory. Semantic memory is the subclass of generic
memory that involves memory of abstract knowledge. Examples are
the knowledge underlying the statement, "the speed of light is a
constant," and "I have always avoided abstractions."
Philosophers, logicians, and psychologists have frequently
represented this type of abstract knowledge with some form of
propositional notation. Recalling information from semantic
memory is not typically accompanied by an experience of mental
imagery. However, if the knowledge required is strongly
associated with highly imageable information one may experience
imagery during recall (i.e., in answering the question "What is
the capital of France?" one might have an image of the Eiffel
Tower).
Perceptual memory. Perceptual memory is the subclass of
generic memory that involves the memory of generic perceptual
information. Examples are the information contained in a generic
perceptual memory of a map of the United States or of the capital
letter "E." Recalling information from generic perceptual memory
is typically experienced in terms of mental imagery. For
example, if asked "What state is directly to the south of
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Oklahoma?" or "How many corners in a capital letter 'E'?" most
people report experiencing a "generic visual image." The generic
images are not typically experienced as involving a particular
time and location. Both personal memory and generic perceptual
memory have consistent mental image properties but they involve
somewhat different phenomenal experiences. For example, a
generic image will tend to be a figure without an imaginal
ground, irrelevant attributes may not be present and it more
often occurs in a single modality.
Skill
A skill is the ability to carry out a practiced motor
performance or cognitive operation. When skilled actions are
carried out there is typically no experience of mental imagery.
Three important types of skills are motor skills, cognitive
skills, and rote linguistic skills.
Motor skill. Motor skills can involve the execution of a
single motor action or a complex sequence of motor actions. An
example of a simple motor skill would be pressing the "K" key on
a computer to make the Pac Man figure go right, or pushing the
gear shift lever to put a car in reverse. An example of a more
complex motor skill would be the skill involved in swimming or
playing tennis. Note that the complex motor skills are
generative, in the sense that if a tennis ball arrives in some
unique position a skilled tennis player can hit it with a motor
action never previously produced.
Cognitive skill. Cognitive skills involve the execution of
practiced cognitive operations. These skills are generative in
the sense that the cognitive operations can be applied to a class
of new instances, and that class may be indefinitely large.
Examples of cognitive skills are taking the square root of a
number, and making the subject and verb of English sentences
agree in number.
Rote linguistic skill. Rote linguistic skill involves the
ability to produce surface structure linguistic objects. This
skill differs from motor skills and cognitive skills in several
important respects. The skill deals with the meaningless surface
structure aspects of particular linguistic objects and it is not
generative. Having learning a rote skill is simply to have
mastered a given set of surface linguistic objects, and it does
not allow generative transfer to a new set of surface linguistic
objects. Examples of rote skills are the ability to say the
alphabet and to give one's social security number.
Reflections of the Classification in Ordinary Language
A number of philosophers (Locke, 1971; Malcolm, 1963) have
suggested that there are linguistic "tests" for the three
fundamental categories of memory outlined above (i.e., personal
memory, generic memory, and skill). Apparently these memory
categories are fundamental enough so that the ordinary language
reflects the differences among them. The three linguistic frames
are: "I remember X"; "I remember that X"; and "I remember how to
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X." Personal memory statements tend to be acceptable in the
first frame, but not the second two. Thus, "I remember the
expression on the experimenter's face" and *"I remember that the
expression on the experimenter's face" and *"I remember how to
the expression on the experimenter's face." Generic memory
statements tend to be acceptable in the first and second frames,
but not in the third. Thus, for semantic memory "I remember the
speed of light is a constant" and "I remember that the speed of
light is a constant," but *"I remember how to the speed of light
is a constant." Similarly for generic perceptual memory: "I
remember Texas is directly to the south of Oklahoma" and "I
remember that Texas is directly to the south of Oklahoma," but
*"I remember how to Texas is directly to the south of Oklahoma."
Motor and cognitive skill statements tend to be acceptable in the
third frame, but not the first two. Thus, for motor skills, "I
remember how to swim," but *"I remember swim" and *"I remember
that swim." For cognitive skills, "I remember how to take the
square root of a number" but *"I remember take the square root of
a number" and *"I remember that take the square root of a
number." Rote linguistic statements tend to be acceptable in the
first and third frames. Thus "I remember the alphabet" and "I
remember how to say the alphabet," but *"I remember that the
alphabet." While these tests do not work all the time, the fact
that they work as well as they do is impressive. The fact that
the ordinary language reflects the memory distinctions provides
independent evidence that these are important categories of our
mental life.
Memory Classifications b Psychologists
In this section we want to examine two major landmarks in
the analysis of memory phenomena: the position of Ebbinghaus
(1885/1964) in the first experimental investigation of memory,
and Tulving's (1972) more recent distinction between episodic and
semantic memory.
Ebbinghaus
In the first chapter of the Ebbinghaus monograph on human
memory he discusses three forms of memory. he identifies one
form that seems closest to personal memory as outlined above. He
says,
Mental states of every kind--sensations, feelings, ideas--
which were at one time present in consciousness and then
have disappeared from it, have not with their disappearance
absolutely ceased to exist . . [we] can call back into
consciousness by an exertion of the will directed to this
purpose the seemingly lost states (or, indeed, in case these
consisted in immediate sense-perceptions, we can recall
their true memory images). (1885/1964, p. 1)
Ebbinghaus' second form of memory was an involuntary type of personal
memory which is not relevant to this discussion. The final form of memory
outlined by Ebbinghaus was similar to skill as it was discussed above. He
states,
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there is a third and large group to be reckoned with here.
The vanished mental states give indubitable proof of their
continuing existence even if they themselves do not return
to consciousness at all . . The boundless domain of the
effect of accumulated experiences belongs here.
(1885/1964, p. 2)
In the section of the monograph related to the methods of
the natural sciences Ebbinghaus argues that psychologists should
study skills because the study of this type of memory requires
"less dependence upon introspection" (p. 8). In fact, Ebbinghaus
went on to suggest that in studying skill the method of recall
was too likely to be influenced by conscious mental processes,
and so he chose to use the method of savings (i.e., the
improvement in the speed of learning of a task due to previous
trials with the task). While later researchers decided that
Ebbinghaus had been a little too limited in not allowing recall
techniques, they essentially accepted the methodologically
motivated focus on skill. For 80 years the experimental study of
memory was the study of rote linguistic skill, with an occasional
study of motor skills (e.g., McGeoch & Irion, 1952; Melton,
1964).
Tulving
In the late 1960's a few psychologists (e.g., Collins &
Quillian, 1969) were able to break out of the Ebbinghaus emphasis
on skill and began to carry out experiments that tested semantic
memory. The relationship of these studies to the traditional
verbal learning experiments remained a puzzle for a few years
until Tulving's insightful paper in 1972. Tulving pointed out
the differences between the traditional verbal learning
experiments and the new semantic memory experiments, and proposed
that the differences be formulated in terms of a distinction
between semantic memory and episodic memory.
Semantic memory. Tulving states that semantic memory is
"the memory necessary for the use of language . . . Lthe]
organized knowledge a person possesses about words and other
verbal symbols, their meaning and referents, about relations
among them" (1972, p. 386). The definition of semantic memory
given in our botany clearly follows Tulving's usage, although we
tend to de-emphasize the focus on linguistic information and
instead treat semantic memory as memory of all abstract things.
The other major way in which our classification differs from
Tulving's is that we consider that an individual's overall
general knowledge covers more than just semantic memory. Thus,
in our classification we have adopted the term generic memory for
the broader class of general knowledge (see Hintzman, 1978, and
Schonfield & Stones, 1979, for a similar view) and retained the
term semantic memory for the subclass of memory for abstract
things. One important advantage for our approach is that it
allows us to treat the important class of generic perceptual
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information and thereby to incorporate ordinary memory phenomena
such as the occurrence of "mental maps."
While we have disagreed with some aspects of Tulving's
construct of semantic memory, one should not lose sight of the
importance of this construct in the development of psychological
theories of memory. By distinguishing semantic memory from other
types of memory Tulving recognized that recall of general
knowledge is one important type of memory that must be included
in a successful description of the forms of human memory.
Episodic memory. While Tulving's description of semantic
memory clarified thinking about memory for generic knowledge, his
account of episodic memory has definite problems. Tulving states
that episodic memory "stores information about temporally dated
episodes or events and temporal--spatial relations among these
events" (1972, p. 385) and proposes that instances of episodic
memory refer "to a personal experience that is remembered in its
temporal-spatial relation to other such experiences" (p. 387).
It seems fairly clear that when Tulving gives an abstract
definition of episodic memory he is describing personal memory as
outlined in our classification.
The problem arises when one examines the examples of
episodic memory given in his paper. One of four examples was the
statement "Last year, while on my summer vacation, I met a
retired sea captain who knew more jokes than any other person I
have ever met" (p. 386). Taken at face value this appears to be
an example of generic memory as we have used the term. The
statement seems to refer to Tulving's knowledge that he met a sea
captain during his last summer vacation. A clear example of
personal memory would have been a statement such as "I remember
sitting on the bar stool, drinking a hot toddy, while he told me
the travelling sailor joke, etc." One of the other of the four
examples suggests a deeper problem. This example is "I know the
word that was paired with DAX in this list was FRIGID" (p. 387).
In terms of our classification this is either an example of
generic memory ("I remember that DAX was the syllable paired with
FRIGID") or an example of a rote linguistic skill (given the item
DAX the subject produces "FRIGID"). Since Tulving was using this
example as an instance of episodic memory, he must not have
intended the generic memory interpretation. This leaves the rote
skill interpretation. This classification of an instance of rote
skill under the heading of episodic memory apparently reflects a
general decision on Tulving's part to classify rote skill as a
type of episodic memory, since Tulving explicitly states (p. 402)
that traditional verbal learning experiments are to be considered
to be experiments investigating episodic memory.
Thus, in terms of the memory classification we have outlined
above, Tulving's treatment of episodic memory is inconsistent.
Tulving's formal definition of episodic memory seems very close
to our definition of personal memory, yet the examples given and
the classification of the traditional laboratory experiments as
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instances of episodic memory are inconsistent with his
definition. Nevertheless, virtually every psychology text
written since Tulving's classic paper quotes his definition of
episodic memory, and then states that the memory experiments in
the Ebbinghaus tradition are all examples of episodic memory.
Examination of our initial example of the undergraduate
going to the psychology experiment shows the problems produced by
this inconsistency with respect to personal memory and skill.
Our hypothetical undergraduate had 20 trials on a long paired-
associate list that resulted in the development of the rote
verbal skill of producing the responses when given the stimuli.
We argued that the undergraduate would probably have a strong
personal memory of coming to the building and starting the
experiment, but it seems to us highly unlikely that the
undergraduate could have a personal memory for a particular
trial, say Trial 13, in the series. It would appear that the
conditions for the development of skill are, in fact,
antithetical to the development of personal memory (this issue
will be discussed again later in the article). Thus, it seems to
us that the treatment of episodic memory in current discussions
of human memory contains a conceptual inconsistency and that an
analysis more like the one we have proposed is needed to resolve
this inconsistency.
Memory Classifications by Philosophers
In carrying out investigations of memory, philosophers have
tended to use a more differentiated classification scheme than
that of psychologists. The first modern philosophical discussion
of the issues is that of Henri Bergson (1911). Bergson
distinguished two forms of memory, "memory par excellence" and
"habit memory"; these correspond fairly closely to our personal
memory and skill memory. Bertrand Russell (1921) retained the
division of memory into two forms. His "true memory" and "habit
memory" are quite close to our personal memory and skill memory.
In somewhat more recent times a number of philosophers added
memory for knowledge into their classification schemes and have
adopted a distinction that corresponds to our personal memory,
semantic memory, and skill memory. Furlong (1951) uses the terms
retrospective memory, nonretrospective remembering that, and
nonretrospective remembering how. Ayer (1956) uses the terms
event memory, factual memory, and habit memory; while Locke
(1971) adopts the terms personal memory, factual memory, and
practical memory.
For the most part these theoretical discussions of memory by
philosophers have had little impact on psychological research.
However, it is interesting to note that the one recent revision
of memory classification, that of Tulving (1972), may derive
indirectly from the philosophers. In Tulving's paper he gives
credit to an earlier distinction between "remembrances" and
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"memoria" by Reiff and Scheerer (1959). This distinction
corresponds roughly to our personal vs. nonpersonal memory.
Examination of the section of the Reiff and Scheerer monograph on
memory distinctions shows that they based their treatment on the
early work of Bergson, thus showing a fairly direct link between
the episodic/semantic distinction and the philosophical
tradition.
There is a striking contrast between psychology and
philosophy in what types of memory have been the focus of
interest. Most of the first 80 years of research on memory in
psychology were directed at the problems of rote verbal skill.
(There were exceptions, such as the work on memory of the
Wurzburg psychologists, of the Functionalists in the United
States, and of the Gestalt psychologists.) The emphasis on skill
by psychologists was driven by methodological and metatheoretical
considerations. The study of semantic memory seems to require
the introduction of abstract entities, the study of personal
memory seems to require the introduction of mental images; and
neither of these was acceptable to most memory researchers during
this period. The research of Collins and Quillian (1969) and
Rumelhart, Lindsay, and Norman (1972) opened up the study of
semantic memory in psychology, and the present chapter argues for
empirical work on personal memory.
The philosophers have taken a very different approach. In
general, they have tended to find skill the least interesting
form of memory. Initially, with the work of Bergson and Russell
the focus was on personal memory. Thus, for example, Russell
called personal memory "the essense of memory" (p. 167). In the
more recent work philosophers have continued to discuss the
problem of personal memory and its degree of veridicality, but
they also have focused on the problems of memory for knowledge.
Our conclusion from this brief historical sketch is that
current experimental and theoretical work on memory by
psychologists should be more pluralistic. In particular, more
attention should be given to the study of personal memory.
A STRUCTURAL ACCOUNT OF HUMAN MEMORY
Purpose
The purpose of this section is to develop a more analytic
account of the structure of human memory. In this section we
attempt to work out the logical possibilities of the forms of
human memory instead of simply describing a number of types that
occur in our normal interchange with the world. We also intend
our structural model to reflect some aspects of the processes
that lead to various types of memory representations. Finally,
we try to follow our own suggestion and take the data of
phenomenal experience as a fundamental aspect of a description of
the structure of human memory.
Overview of Structural Account
The essence of our organization of memory is given in Table
2. This table is structured with types of input to the memory
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system along the top and types of acquisition conditions along
the side. Within the cells are the hypothesized mental events
resulting from the conjunction of the particular type of input
and type of acquisition condition.
Insert Table 2 about here.
Acquisition Conditions (Rows)
We consider three important types of acquisition conditions:
exposure to a single instance of the input, exposure to multiple
instances of the input without variation (e.g., ten exposures to
the same picture or ten trials on the same serial list of
nonsense syllables), and exposure to input that is repeated with
variation. The category of repetition with variation is intended
to cover a range of levels of abstraction of the input. Thus,
multiple exposures to the same dog in various circumstances would
be repetition with variation and so would the more abstract level
provided by exposure to a number of instances of different types
of dogs.
When analyzing the types of memory in the single instance
condition we will assume that the memory tasks will be directed
at information specific to the single instances. In analyzing
the types of memory in both of the repeated items conditions we
will assume that the memory tasks will be directed at recall that
utilizes the experiences with the set of repeated items and not
at one of the instances.
In each input condition we have divided the resulting mental
events into imaginal events and nonimaginal events. This is
motivated by our desire to treat the phenomenal data as a serious
part of theory construction. Note that the division is between
imaginal and nonimaginal and not between phenomenal and
nonphenomenal. We adopted this approach primarily for
methodological reasons. We believe that there are phenomenal
states that are nonimaginal (e.g., the imageless thoughts of the
Wurzburg psychologists, Woodworth, and Binet; see Calkins, 1909;
Humphrey, 1951; Ogden, 1911). However, this is a difficult area
and the data have been hard to interpret (see Pani, 1983). Thus,
until clarifying data are obtained on this issue, we will
restrict our analysis primarily to phenomenal reports of mental
images, where the data are clearer and easier to obtain.
In most cases the types of mental representations we
postulate for the nonimaginal cells are schemas (Brewer &
Nakamura, in press; Minsky, 1975; Rumelhart, 1980; Schank &
Abelson, 1977). Schemas are nonphenomenal mental representations
of organized knowledge. When an input occurs and activates a
schema, then the organized knowledge can be related to the input.
This process makes possible: expectations, inferences, and
active anticipations. The term "schema" will be used to cover a
wide range of knowledge structures--from object schemas that
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allow one to infer what the nonvisible side of an object might
look like, to motor production schemas which allow the smooth
output of a particular motor action.
This discussion of schemas raises an interesting problem.
How do these abstract schemas differ from the "abstract
knowledge" that we referred to in our discussion of semantic
memory? It may be that these two types of mental representation
should actually be considered to be of one type. However, we
would like to distinguish between them. We propose that semantic
memory is knowledge of abstract things, whereas schemas are
abstract knowledge of things.
Types of Input (Columns)
The columns in the analysis are organized according to our
view of the fundamental types of input that lead to the various
forms of memory representation. In those cases where the input
involves forming a representation of a content from the external
world, we have subdivided the input into meaningful stimuli and
meaningless stimuli. We do this because there are important
differences between memory for meaningful stimuli, which are
easily encoded into preexisting schemas, and memory for
meaningless stimuli, which are more difficult to encode into such
schemas. In addition, the distinction is of practical value,
since how one interprets a particular memory experiment is
frequently determined by the nature of the input with respect to
this distinction.
A Structural Theory of Human Memory
In this section we examine the hypothesized mental events
resulting from the conjunction of the particular types of input
and types of acquisition condition. We will proceed through the
table by types of input (i.e., column by column).
Visual-Spatial
Meaningful. We postulate that a single exposure to a
meaningful visual-spatial input will lead to a particularized
visual image. This is, of course, one of the strong components
of personal memory as described in the botany of memory.
In his classic review of introspective methods for the study
of mental imagery, Angell (1910) suggests that brief exposure to
an arbitrary array of objects or pictures, followed by a memory
task requiring information about the concrete properties of the
display, is one of the best ways to elicit visual imagery (also
see Kuhlmann, 1909).
There have been a number of recent experiments examining
memory for single exposures to meaningful visual-spatial input
(e.g., Brewer & Treyens, 1981; Hock & Schmelzkopf, 1980; Mandler
& Parker, 1976) but these experiments rarely include data
concerning the phenomenal experiences of the subjects during the
recall task. However, from the informal comments of the subjects
in the Brewer and Treyens experiment on memory for rooms and from
the fact that they sometimes pointed to an imaginary position in
space when answering a question, we think that appropriately
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designed experiments will support the assertion that this type of
input leads to particularized visual image representations.
The mental images associated with personal memory appear to
be very vivid and to include much "irrelevant" detail. It is not
clear that one can show increased recall of information based on
these mental experiences. However, if one could show such
evidence in recall, then one might want to hypothesize that the
representations for personal memories are less reworked by schema
processes and somehow closer to the initial perceptual input than
other forms of recall. This difficult and controversial issue is
clearly in need of additional study.
Exposure to a single instance of a meaningful visual-spatial
input leads to schema instantiation. The individual uses generic
schema information to interpret the particular visual-spatial
input. The resulting instantiated schema representation consists
of an integration of the information contained in the new
instance and information from the generic schema. Thus, in the
Brewer and Treyens (1981) experiment subjects attempted to recall
an office in which they had been for a brief period. The
information given in recall was a mixture of information that was
clearly from the particular room (e.g., it contained a Skinner
box) and information that was not actually in the particular
room, but was derived from their general office schema (e.g., it
contained books). Note that the case of schema instantiation is
part of the larger issue of the interaction of particular input
with generic knowledge. It is likely that both generic visual
images and generic schemas can interact with the information
contained in input from single instances to produce partially
reconstructed visual images and instantiated schemas (e.g.,
Neisser, 1981, 43-48).
Multiple exposures without variation of a meaningful visual-
spatial input should lead to a more articulate image. However,
if there is a consistent focus of attention on particular items
or properties, then the meaningful nature of the material may
lead to a reduction from the image of less relevant properties.
Thus, while we would expect context to occur in the visual-
spatial component of a personal memory, it may not always remain
in cases of multiple exposures.
If an object or class of objects is repeated with variation
we postulate that a generic visual image results. This is a
topic that needs research. For highly variable classes such as
"furniture" it seems unlikely that one forms a generic image
(e.g., Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976); for
other less variable classes (e.g., "dog," "triangle") more data
are needed. Essentially we are assuming that the process of
abstraction (e.g., Gibson, 1969) leads to the production of
generic images from experience with multiple differing
particulars.
This suggests an interesting problem. Does the process of
abstraction lead to a generic image and multiple particular
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images or is there loss of the particularized images? Medin and
Schaffer (1978) have proposed a theory of concept classification
that emphasizes recall of specific instances. Brewer and Dupree
(1981, 1983b) have carried out an experiment on the development
of generic place representations and have found that there is
apparently some loss of the particularized instances that go into
making up the generic representation. Clearly another area that
needs additional research.
When meaningful visual-spatial inputs are repeated with
variation we assume the development of schemas in addition to
generic images. The reason that we postulate nonimaginal schema
representations for objects and places is that we do not think
generic images are abstract enough to account for much of our
visual-spatial knowledge. We feel that there is abstract
knowledge about objects and places that is somehow specific to
them and not a part of semantic memory. Thus, for objects we
would consider the classic Piagetian object schema to contain a
nonimaginal schema component. For places, consider the following
question, "Which is closer, your bathroom or the post office?"
It seems to us that one may answer this question with nonimaginal
place schema information and without generic image information or
information from semantic memory. These are difficult problems
and clearly more theory development is needed to make progress on
these issues.
Meaningless. We turn now to the second column in Table 2.
A meaningless visual-spatial input is one that has little schema
information already existing in long-term memory. We assume that
exposure to stimuli of this type results in an attempt to build a
new schema or impose an old schema (see Piaget, 1952, 1954;
Rumelhart & Norman, 1977). Our position here is similar to that
taken by Bartlett (1932) in his discussion of the use of nonsense
syllables in memory experiments. Bartlett argued that when faced
with "meaningless" material subjects would attempt to impose
meaning on the stimuli. He referred to this process as "effort
after meaning" (p. 20). In more recent times investigators in the
Ebbinghaus tradition have shown, in some detail, the powerful
effects that effort after meaning has on learning meaningless
linguistic material (Montague, Adams & Kiess, 1966; Prytulak,
1971).
The property of meaningless items that makes them
meaningless is that the imposition of prior schemas is only
partially successful. Thus, to the degree that schema
instantiation is inadequate, material must be newly learned from
immediate perception. Several investigators have pointed out
that the memory for such cases should be relatively imagistic and
depictive, since no other form of memory representation is
available (Kosslyn, 1980, 1981; Kosslyn & Jolicoeur, 1980; Pani,
1982, 1983).
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The occurrence of repetition with variation of instances of
an initially meaningless pattern should lead to the development
of a new generic image and a new schema. The classic experiments
of Posner (Posner, 1969; Posner & Keele, 1968) on recognition
memory for dot patterns generated from an underlying pattern
represent an attempt to study this process. Posner (1969)
suggests that the form of representation in these tasks may be
abstract nonimaginal schemas. From our perspective it would be
interesting to carry out these experiments in a recall paradigm,
with a variety of types of schemas, and obtain phenomenal reports
from the subjects during recall. Do the subjects report generic
mental images, images of particular instances, or no images at
all?
Visual-Temporal
Meaningful. We now begin the third column. We assume that
a single exposure to a meaningful visual-temporal event leads to
the development of nonimaginal schemas. Observed causal events
lead to event schemas and observed goal-directed actions lead to
plan schemas (cf. Schank & Abelson, 1977). An empirical study of
memory for goal-directed actions by Lichtenstein and Brewer
(1980) supports our assumptions on this issue. These
investigators had subjects view a videotape of an actor carrying
out a series of goal-directed actions and showed that a wide
range of recall data could be accounted for by assuming that the
subjects had developed plan schemas for the observed actions.
There are few data on the imaginal properties resulting from
observed visual-temporal events. Lichtenstein and Brewer (1980)
did not, unfortunately, gather any systematic data on this issue.
However, some informal observations during those experiments
suggest that rarely do subjects report the phenomenal experience
of being able to "replay in their mind's eye" a smooth version of
what they saw. Instead, they tended to report sequences of
static images with some limited movement.
An early discussion of mental imagery by Ladd (1894)
supports this view. Ladd believed that the progressive
"condensation" of imaginal representation extended in time is a
fundamental principle of the development of cognition. Pani
(1983) has suggested that the deletion of redundant material from
the imaging of visual-temporal input would result in savings of
time and effort. These claims are reminiscent of the views of
Attneave (1954) and Hochberg (1968) on the perception of visual-
spatial structure. They point out that there are particular
parts of items that convey relatively large amounts of
information about the nature of an object, and other parts that
are relatively uninformative. This suggests that the remaining
information in the imaginal representation of visual-temporal
inputs consists of images of the more informative stages of
events.
On the basis of these various considerations we have
tentatively assumed that single exposures to meaningful visual-
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temporal events lead to sequences of static visual images, rather
than to single temporally continuous images. This view contrasts
with the inclinations of much current imagery theory (e.g.,
Kosslyn, 1980; Shepard, 1978), although Kosslyn does discuss the
"blink" transformation. Clearly more data are needed here.
If a meaningful sequence is repeated without variation, we
assume that it may be converted into a more rigid script.
Examples of events repeated with little variation might be
religious rites and mechanical processes. Again, we have no data
relevant to the issue of the imaginal consequences of repetition
without variation. However, it is possible that condensation may
continue for irrelevant properties. We would also suspect that
repetition would lead to stronger visual imagery for the
information that is retained.
For meaningful events repeated with variation we assume the
development of more abstract plan and event schemas (Schank &
Abelson, 1977; Schmidt, 1976). It is not clear what the imaginal
properties would be for this condition. It is likely that even
after a great deal of condensation, highly informative generic
reference points remain imageable. However, it also is possible
that events can differ enough among themselves so that they are
encoded at a level of abstraction that cannot be captured in an
image.
There is a subset of meaningful visual-temporal events that
we wish to distinguish--memory for personal actions. After an
individual has carried out some goal-directed action, the
individual can recall what he or she did. This type of recall
seems similar to the recall of the actions of another person.
However, the actor has direct access to the actor's plans, to
knowledge about intentions not acted upon, and to other aspects
of conscious mental life that occurred during the action. We
will provisionally assume that memory for personal actions can be
treated as essentially similar to memory for the observed actions
of others.
Meaningless. We assume that subjects exposed to meaningless
visual-temporal events will attempt to impose causal and plan
schemas on the events. However, there will be numerous cases
where unique perceptual properties of a particular event are
remembered. As we have argued before, imagery may be the primary
way in which such properties as these will be represented at
first. A recent experiment by Brewer and Dupree (1983a) supports
these assumptions. Brewer and Dupree obtained data showing that
subjects attempted to provide plan schemas for relatively
meaningless actions and that when they did it improved recall.
No phenomenal report data were obtained in this experiment;
however, the recognition data and the overall pattern of results
can be used to draw inferences about the imagery for meaningful
and meaningless actions. It is possible that after viewing an
action there is visual information that is retained over a period
of hours, but that after several days the information is greatly
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reduced and underlying plan information is predominantly what is
retained.
Auditory (Nonlinguistic)
The auditory input conditions were filled in by analogy with
the visual columns. We have little specific to contribute to the
analysis of this type of input, and have included it primarily
for consistency. However, there are a number of studies that
suggest that the auditory columns will be analogous to the visual
columms (e.g., Garner, 1974; Williams & Aiken, 1975).
A complete description of memory would also include an
account of memory for music. This is a complex issue. For
example, we suspect that an analysis of music should share some
of the characteristics of our analysis of linguistic input.
However, we know so little about these issues at the present that
we are not willing to speculate.
Emotional Situations
In an earlier version of this article we omitted memory for
emotions because so little is known about the topic. However, we
have decided to include it because just making the attempt seemed
to force us to ask interesting questions. In one of the few
recent discussions of memory for emotions, Bower (1981) proposes
that memory for emotions should be analyzed in terms of "emotion
nodes." Given the framework adopted in this chapter there are
additional issues that must be resolved. Does the memory for an
emotion have an emotion reliving component (an "emotional
image"), and does the memory for an emotion have a nonimaginal
"emotion schema" component?
There are formidable problems here. For example, if one
attempts to carry out introspective studies of memory for
emotion, it is necessary to distinguish the current emotions from
the recalled emotions. The problem arises due to the fact that
recalling a situation that made you angry can cause you once
again to become angry about the situation. Try recalling "your
most embarrassing moment" for an intuitive example of the
difficulty.
A second issue is a theoretical one. What does it mean to
talk about "emotion schemas"? Clearly one can come to have
semantic knowledge about any type of input in our table. Thus,
one can explicitly enter into semantic memory the fact that "the
state to the south of Oklahoma is Texas." Similarly, one can
have semantic knowledge that "I was angry when I received the
letter last week." The theoretical puzzle is whether it makes
any sense to postulate something called an emotion schema
independently of the knowledge that you felt a particular
emotion. The most sophisticated treatment of this issue that we
know of is by St. Augustine. In the Confessions, Augustine
discussed the representation issue we just outlined, and he
rejected (on the basis of his own introspections) the view that
one relives an emotion when remembering it. However, he also
rejected the view that one simply has semantic knowledge of the
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emotions. He postulated a third form of representation,
"notions," to deal with the problem. In our terms, he was
apparently suggesting that memory for emotions consists of
emotion schemas without emotion images or semantic memory of
emotions. Obviously, the issue of memory for emotion is in need
of empirical and conceptual clarification.
Linguistic
Special properties of language. Memory for linguistic input
is the most thoroughly studied area in the experimental study of
memory. It is, however, one of the most subtle in terms of the
structure of memory. First one has to take into account that
language input can be used to convey many different types of
information. This means that, in remembering what was conveyed
by a linguistic input, the memory representations themselves may
not be linguistic in form. Brewer (1980) has argued that
descriptive discourse is represented in terms of visual-spatial
schemas, while narrative discourse is represented in terms of
plan schemas. There is considerable experimental evidence that
can be interpreted to support this assertion. In a study by
Bransford, Barclay and Franks (1972) subjects given sentences
describing objects in simple spatial arrangements produced recall
data that was similar to what one might have expected if the
subjects had actually seen pictures of the scenes described by
the sentences. For narrative discourse, Lichtenstein and Brewer
(1980) have carried out an explicit test. In Experiments 4 and 5
of that paper subjects were given narratives describing a series
of goal-directed actions. The pattern of recall data was
essentially the same as that produced by subjects who saw actual
videotapes of the goal-directed actions. Thus, for our purposes,
any time linguistic input conveys information characteristic of
some other type of input we will assume that the form of
representation in memory is the form postulated for that type of
input (e.g., visual-spatial for linguistic descriptions). For
example, in terms of Table 2 this approach means that meaningful
linguistic input of narrative form should be analyzed as if it
occurred in the visual-temporal (meaningful) input column. Note,
however, that we do not assume such a shift for expository text.
Brewer (1980) has argued that the underlying representations for
expository text are abstract propositions or thoughts. To put it
another way, expository text is linguistic input that encodes
semantic memory information.
A second way in which meaningful linguistic input differs
from the other forms of input is that we assume that, in addition
to perceptual images (e.g., the sound of a word), there are two
abstract levels of representation arranged in a hierarchical
fashion: surface structure production schemas, and thoughts. In
particular, we are making the assumption that there is a separate
abstract level of representation that is a nonimaginal surface
structure production schema. This allows the overt recall of a
nonsense syllable such as DAX without imaging that syllable
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first. This contrasts with the view that surface structure must
be encoded in terms of auditory or visual images. Thus, from our
perspective the auditory occurrence of a meaningful word such as
"truth" leads to three levels of representation: an auditory
image, a surface structure production schema, and the thought
(meaning) expressed by the word.
Meaningful. Our mode of analysis leaves memory for
expository linguistic input with no image properties. We have
assumed that the basic meaning 'for this material is in terms of
abstract nonimaginal thought. Imaginal representation of the
visual or auditory properties of the presented word would be
treated under memory for surface structure information. If the
word were concrete and gave rise to visual imagery then that
would be treated under memory for visual-spatial information. As
mentioned earlier, we believe that one may want to consider the
existence of phenomenal but imageless thoughts for this type of
representation, but for now we will ignore that possibility. Our
analysis of the representation of meaningful linguistic input in
terms of an abstract nonimaginal representation is consistent
with the standard approach in current cognitive psychology (e.g.,
Anderson & Bower, 1973; Bransford & Franks, 1971; Kintsch, 1974),
and with the earlier work on imageless thoughts (of Calkins,
1909; Humphrey, 1951; Ogden, 1911).
There is a large experimental literature on memory for
thoughts supporting the position outlined above (Anderson, 1974;
Bock & Brewer, 1974; Brewer, 1975; Graesser & Mandler, 1975;
Sachs, 1967). The typical approach in these experiments is to
give subjects a sentence memory task (recall or recognition) and
to show that the subjects retain the ideas expressed in the
sentences even when they do not retain the particular input
surface form.
We have included abstract nonimaginal representations under
the heading of input from meaningful expository linguistic
discourse because that is probably the most frequent form of
input for these processes. However, we believe that information
can enter the system of abstract nonimaginal representations
(semantic memory) through a variety of nonlinguistic interchanges
with the world and through internal reworkings of the information
already in the system.
When one has a single exposure to a trivial piece of
knowledge it is easy to become confused about the appropriate
form of representation (thought vs. surface structure). Take the
example of someone who has learned the names of the state
capitals so that when given "Illinois," this individual says
"Springfield." We would argue that this performance typically
requires two levels of representation (surface structure and
thought) and so should be distinguished from the case of learning
to say "DAX" when given "ZEQ." Evidence that some abstract
factual knowledge had been acquired in the first case would be
shown by the individual's ability to paraphrase the information
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and draw inferences. Thus, having learned Illinois-Springfield
our subject could paraphrase the information, "Springfield is the
capital of Illinois" or "The capital of Illinois is Springfield."
Similarly the subject should be able to make the inference that
"Chicago is not the capital of Illinois." Note that for someone
who did not know English the ability to give "Springfield" when
presented with "Illinois" would be merely an example of memory
represented in the form of a surface structure production schema.
The effect of repetition with variation for meaningful
linguistic input can have a different effect than it has for the
other inputs. There is not necessarily a shift toward more
abstract representations. With even a single instance of
expository language the initial representation is already
abstract, and its content may be extremely abstract (e.g.,
"Religion stems from the need to know"). When there is
repetition with variation there is an increase in the richness
and complexity of the representation.
Meaningless (surface structure). We postulate that after
exposure to a single instance of a meaningless linguistic input
individuals have an auditory or visual image representation.
Some of the early introspective studies of memory support this
position (Fernald, 1912).
In addition to image representations, a single exposure to a
meaningless linguistic input leads to the beginning of a surface
structure production schema. The development of surface
structure production schemas for more than a few items is a skill
that takes a number of repetitions to develop. The contrast
between the ability to produce thoughts and to produce surface
structure schemas was noted by Ebbinghaus (1885/1964, p. 50), and
was studied by a number of investigators as the difference
between "logical" and "rote" memory (Cofer, 1941; Welborn &
English, 1937).
For purposes of clarity we have been using examples of
meaningless linguistic input to discuss the development of
surface structure production schemas. However, because of the
hierarchically organized nature of the two forms of linguistic
representations, one can also investigate the development of
surface structure production schemas for meaningful sentences.
There is a wide range of studies showing that for meaningful
sentences the memory for the underlying thoughts is better than
the memory for the surface structure (e.g., Brewer, 1975; Sachs,
1967).
Consideration of what it means to repeat a surface structure
with acceptable variation (change the type face, shift speakers)
shows that this type of input does not lead to the same level of
abstraction as the other inputs.
There is one area where rote linguistic skill is very
important. Each native speaker of a language has to master the
tens of thousands of lexical forms that make up the vocabulary of
the language. Clearly the ability to develop surface structure
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production schemas plays a crucial role in learning a spoken
language.
Cognitive Operations
Cognitive skills involve the execution of practiced
cognitive operations.
Cognitive skills differ from rote skills in that cognitive
skills are generative and rote skills are not. Once an
individual has learned a cognitive skill that individual can
typically apply it to a large class of new objects (e.g., taking
square roots); but once an individual has learned a rote skill
that individual has the ability to produce only one set of
surface structure objects. The rote skill of saying the
multiplication table in English does not allow one to say the
alphabet.
The distinction between cognitive skill and recall of
information from semantic memory can sometimes be unclear. We
tend to classify a task as an instance of cognitive skill if the
task is procedural, if it is knowledge how rather than
knowledge that. The difference is clear in the case of the rules
of syntax of one's native language. A child has the cognitive
skill of performing many syntactic operations before entering
school and in the course of formal education the child comes to
develop knowledge that about some of the rules. This is
presumably the distinction that Chomsky was intending when he
stated, "a generative grammar attempts to specify what the
speaker actually knows, not what he may report about his
knowledge" (1965, p. 8).
There has recently been a renewed interest in the study of
cognitive skill in psychology (Anderson, 1981; Card, Moran &
Newell, 1980). Cognitive skills, like the other skills, require
a number of repetitions before smooth, successful operation.
Thus, it is difficult to discuss the representation that results
after a single operation of a cognitive skill. However, in a
recent study of the early stages of learning to use a text editor
Ross (1982) has obtained verbal protocols suggesting that the
subjects attempt to supplement the missing cognitive skill with
other types of knowledge. They use personal memories, "Oh yes, I
remember when I pressed that button over there the whole screen
went blank" and semantic knowledge "Let's see, the rule is that
to change a word in the text, select the word, press capital 'R',
type the new word and press the ESC key." One has the feeling
that what is going on here is similar to Bartlett's "effort after
meaning," perhaps "effort after production."
When cognitive operations have been repeated many times
there is little or no imaginal accompaniment (Book, 1908). It is
presumably this observation that led Lashley to state "No
activity of mind is ever conscious" (1960, p. 532). It may be
the case that cognitive operations are a type of mental
occurrence that is intrinsically nonphenomenal. On the other
hand, it may be that they are phenomenally experienced only
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during the early stages of the acquisition of a skill and not
later on (see Pani, 1983).
Motor Performance
The issues relating to the acquisition of motor skill are
similar to those discussed for cognitive skill. Many
investigators in this area have suggested that, when motor
actions have been practiced, the conscious correlates of
performing the action are reduced or eliminated (Adams, 1971;
Book, 1908; Fitts & Posner, 1967). The classic discussion is in
James' chapter on habit. He states, "habit diminishes the
conscious attention with which our acts are performed" (1890,
Vol. 1, p. 114). While there is agreement that conscious
processes occur during the early stages of the acquisition of a
motor skill, it is not clear exactly what types of processes
these are. For example, they may be motor imagery, imageless
thoughts, or other types of memory representation used in "effort
after production."
Plan Production
The carrying out of intended activities involves the
production of complex sequences of actions (e.g., driving to a
new restaurant). We assume that these intentional actions are
structured in terms of plan production schemas. Plan production
schemas organize actions in terms of hierarchically structured
goal-subgoal relations. Plan production is intended to allow us
to include the memory component that is involved in: walking
home from the office, baking a cake, dancing in a square dance.
One might want to argue that plan production is a complex mixture
of cognitive operations and motor performance, but we prefer to
treat plan production as a separate category.
Carrying out a single instance of a new plan seems to be a
memory task in only a limited fashion. In performing a new plan,
say finding your way for the first time from Heathrow Airport to
the British Museum, much of the performance seems to be problem
solving with very general generic memory input. It is not clear
how much imaginal activity occurs when one carries out a new plan
of this type, but there does appear to be a large amount of
nonimaginal phenomenal experience. It seems to us that one is
aware of intentions, the goal, and many subgoals (e.g., "I need
to get from here to the museum . . . I wonder how I can get my
money changed . . . How do I get to the underground, etc.").
In plans carried out with little variation (taking the same
route home from the office every day) it would appear that the
awareness of the subgoals and subplans tends to decline
(Shallice, 1972). It seems likely that it is these fixed plans
that are most likely to lead to "actions slips" (Norman, 1981)
where the individual carries out an action that was not intended.
Carrying out a variety of intentional actions of a given type
leads to the development of generic plan schemas (e.g., going to
restaurants, traveling to new cities).
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STRUCTURE OF MEMORY: IMPLICATIONS
In this section of the chapter we will relate the earlier,
more descriptive botany of memory to our analysis of the
structure of memory. We will also work out some of the
implications of our structural account for a number of particular
issues in the study of human memory.
Relation of the Botany of Memory (Table 1)
to the Structure of Memory (Table 2)
Our intent in outlining the botany of memory was to describe
common types of human memory. Our intent in the structural
account was to give an analytic account of possible types of
human memory along with some indication about how different forms
of memory are acquired. We think that the types of memory
discussed in the botany are the ecologically important subset of
the possible types of memory given in Table 2. They are the
subset that tends to occur in the normal ecological interactions
with the environment.
SIn moving around in the world one tends to be exposed to
many unique co-occurrences of meaningful visual-spatial input,
meaningful visual-temporal input, meaningful auditory input, and
linguistic input. It is roughly this set of representations (the
single instance rows in Table 2) that go into making up personal
memory. In our dealings with the world, and in particular in our
dealings with the products of culture, we are exposed to much
abstract knowledge (facts, propositions, thoughts). It is this
type of knowledge that constitutes semantic memory (the
meaningful linguistic input column). In moving through the
visual world, we tend to view constant objects and constant
places in the environment from a variety of perspectives. It is
this type of interaction with the world that leads to the
development of generic visual memory (the repeated with variation
rows in the visual-spatial input columns). In learning to speak
a language and in memorizing nonsense syllable lists for
experimental psychologists, we develop the surface structure
production schemas that make up rote linguistic skill (the
repeated without variation rows in the meaningless linguistic
input column). In carrying out some of the complex repetitive
processes that are part of modern civilization (arithmetic, text
editing) we come to develop cognitive skills, and finally when we
repeatedly manipulate objects in the world we come to develop
motor skills. Thus, by taking the analysis of the structure of
memory, and looking at naturally occurring human actions, we find
the botany of memory to be a natural consequence of the operation
of the human memory system and the normal organism-environment
interactions in our culture.
Mental Imagery in the Transfer
of Procedural Memory to Semantic Memory
In our analysis of memory we noted that the knowledge
involved in practiced skills is represented in production schemas
and little imaginal experience is reported during a skilled
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performance. However, in the course of pilot work for an
experiment on phenomenal experience during memory (Brewer & Pani,
1982, 1983b) we have uncovered an interesting class of mental
processes. If one asks a subject for a propositional account of
information that "resides in" procedural (skill) memory then
there is a striking occurrence of appropriate mental imagery.
Thus for example:
a. Rote linguistic skill
(1) "What is the seventh letter of the alphabet?"
(2) "What is the next to last digit of your phone
number?"
b. Cognitive skill
(1) "What is the sum of 78 and 43?"
(2) "What are the last three letters of the plural
of irony?"
c. Motor skill
(1) "Which finger do you use to type an 'r'?"
(2) "When backing a car which direction do you turn
the steering wheel in order to make the back of
the car go to the left?"
It appears that in these cases one is able to divide one's
conscious mental processing into two parts. One part of the mind
carries out the procedural task in imagistic form and the other
part of the mind notes the contents of the images and gives the
required propositional answer. It seems to us that this class of
phenomena shows the qualitative difference between knowledge how
and knowledge that and suggests that the mental imagery might
play a functional role in performing the memory task.
In the course of everyday life one rarely needs to perform
procedural tasks in imagistic form. However, mental arithmetic
is an exception. Most mental skills are carried out in
interaction with cultural objects (e.g., a computer terminal for
text editing; pencil and paper for square roots), and we have
argued that during skilled performance little imagery occurs.
However, in everyday life one occasionally needs to carry out the
task of simple arithmetic without paper and pencil and so resorts
to "mental arithmetic" or "doing the problem in your head." In
keeping with our account of mentally performed skills, there
appears to be strong imagery in this task. The phenomenon is so
powerful in this case that when B. F. Skinner (1957) was
attempting to work out a radical behaviorist approach to
psychology he was forced to note that, "In intraverbal chaining,
for example, necessary links are sometimes missing from the
observable data. When someone solves a problem in 'mental
arithmetic,' the initial statement of the problem and the final
overt answer can often be related only by inferring covert
events" (p. 434).
Multiple Forms of Representation
One of the obvious consequences of our analysis of memory is
that there are many different forms of memory representation.
The same event can result in different memory representations (as
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in the intial example of the undergraduate going to the
psychology experiment), and a given recall performance can be
based on a variety of forms of mental representation.
For example, consider a typical semantic memory task where
the subject is asked "What color is a canary?" and responds
correctly. In terms of our analysis the subject's response could
have been based on: (a) a particularized image, (b) a schema (c)
a generic image, (d) semantic memory, or (e) rote linguistic
skill. Clearly, if one is going to construct adequate models of
the memory process one must be sensitive to this issue and
attempt to establish what form of representation the subject is
using in a given performance (see Kosslyn, 1980, for a similar
position).
In general, the proposal we have outlined is going to be
hard on the "nothing but" theorist (e.g., the theorist who says
that the form of representation is nothing but X). For example,
when Begg and Paivio (1969) postulated that abstract sentences
are represented in memory as nothing but surface structures,
Brewer (1975) was able to show the problems with this position by
providing memory data (synonym substitutions) which seem to
require an abstract nonimage form of representation in the recall
of meaningful abstract sentences.
To take another example, it seems to us that many types of
reasoning problems can be solved with both imaginal and
nonimaginal representational processes. Thus, in studying
reasoning problems one must find out what forms of representation
are being used in a particular performance and why (see Banks,
1977; Clark, 1969; Huttenlocher, 1968; Moyer & Dumais, 1978).
The approach we have adopted here can account for many
individual differences in the performance of a given task. When
we ask people to tell us the seventh letter of the alphabet we
usually get long reaction times and strong reports of auditory
and/or visual imagery. However, one individual we tested gave
the response immediately and with little report of imagery. When
we asked the subject some questions to find out why he differed
from our other subjects we found that he was an amateur
cryptographer and had the letter-number correspondences stored in
rote linguistic form.
To take another example, we have recently tried to elicit
personal memory by asking a question such as "What did you have
for breakfast?" The subjects tested gave personal memory
reports, but suppose that a subject had given a response such as
"eggs" very rapidly and with little report of imagery, or feeling
of reliving. We suspect that further questioning would show that
this subject had eggs for breakfast every day and was using
information from semantic memory to answer the question.
Copy Images vs. Reconstructed Images
We find the logical and empirical arguments of Pylyshyn
(1973; 1981) and others against pure copy theories of imagery to
be compelling. It must be the case that at least part of the
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phenomenally experienced image is reconstructed from information
of a nonimaginal kind.
We have recently carried out some experimental work on this
topic. In an earlier study, Brewer and Treyens (1981) showed
that schema-driven inferences occurred in the recall of
information about a room that subjects had been in briefly. The
subjects frequently recalled having seen books in the room, even
though there were no books present. Brewer and Pani (1983a) have
replicated the Brewer and Treyens study, but included detailed
questions about mental imagery experiences after each recall
trial. We found that for present and inferred items of
equivalent memory strength the subjects reported roughly
equivalent amounts and quality of imagery. In other words, the
schema-driven inferences were apparently incorporated into the
phenomenally experienced image of the room.
An important area for this issue is the study of
autobiographical personal memories. As discussed earlier, these
memories are accompanied by a strong belief that they are
veridical. Neisser (1982, pp. 43-48) has recently argued that
even the intense "flashbulb" form of personal memories resulting
from a highly emotional event (e.g., "Where were you when you
heard that Kennedy had been shot?") are not veridical. He has
also shown that John Dean's recall of specific events at the
Watergate hearings was a complex reworking of information from a
number of different occasions (Neisser, 1981). Except for
Neisser's study of John Dean, most of the data here remain
anecdotal, and the standard techniques for studying
autobiographical memory (e.g., Robinson, 1976) do not allow one
to resolve this issue. Brewer (1983) has developed a technique
which should allow a more careful examination of the veridicality
of personal memory. He has subjects carry a random alarm device
and has them record what is occurring when the alarm goes off.
By comparing personal memories occurring at the time of test with
the original record of the event this technique makes possible
the gathering of systematic data on the issue of veridicality of
personal memory.
CONCLUSIONS
In this article we have tried to take a fresh approach to
the problem of human memory. We first attempted to provide a
description of the common forms of memory. We adopted this
strategy because we think that research in memory has frequently
cut short the process of description and moved too soon to the
job of detailed analysis and model building.
We have argued, on theoretical grounds, that the data from
phenomenal experience should be given equal status with the other
forms of data typically gathered in experiments on human memory.
In carrying out our analysis we have attempted to provide an
example of how this data can be used in theory construction
In working out our analysis of the structure of memory we
felt a constant tension between a view of memory as the reliving
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of earlier perceptions and a view of memory as a schema-based
reconstructive process. We hope the analysis succeeds in
providing a synthesis of these two positions.
Compared to other recent theories of memory our position
looks somewhat complex. It seems to us that the complexity in
our analysis is simply a reflection of the complexity of the
problem. We think that many of the classic theories of human
memory have achieved simplicity by ignoring the actual complexity
of the phenomena and by attempting to give a simple image
account, or a simple interference account, or a simple
propositional account.
At the end of many sections of this chapter we found
ourselves saying that more empirical and theoretical work was
needed. We hope that this was not merely ritualistic language on
our part and that, in fact, the framework provided in this paper
does lead one to see new problems and new issues in the study of
memory.
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Table 1
Botany of Memory: Examples
Personal Memory
"When was the last time you spent cash for something?"
"Who was the last person you saw before reading this chapter?"
"Did you see anyone on the ground floor of your office building when you
came to work today?"
Generic Memory
Semantic Memory
"What part of speech is used to modify a noun?"
"What is the opposite of falsehood?"
"Which is faster, the speed of sound or the speed of light?"
Perceptual Memory
"In which hand does the Statue of Liberty hold the torch?"
"How many windows are there in your house?"
"What shape are a German shepherd's ears?"
Skill
Motor Skill
Typing a sequence of random letters from copy
Riding a bicycle
Signing your name
Cognitive Skill
Speaking a sentence with a verb in the past tense
Adding a column of two-digit numbers
Using a text editor
Rote Linguistic Skill
Giving your phone number
Multiplying 2 x 2
Recalling a list of nonsense syllables
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Table 2. A Structural Account of Human Memory
TYPES OF INPUT
Acquisition Conditions . VISUAL-SPATIAL
MEANINGFUL MEANINGLESS
(Objects, Places)
VISUAL-TEMPORAL
MEANINGFUL MEANINGLESS
(Events,Actions)
AUDITORY-NONLINGUISTIC
MEANINGFUL
(Common Sounds)
MEANINGLESS
ginl Particularized Particularized Particularized Particularized Particularized
Imaginal
Visual Images Visual Images Sequence of Sequence of Auditory Images
Single I __ ___Visual Images Visual Images
Instance Instantiated Partially Instantiated Partially Instantiated
onimaginal Schemas Instantiated Schemas Instantiated Schemas
Schemas_ Schemas
Reduced Particularized Reduced Particularized Reduced
Imaginal Particularized Visual Images Particularized Sequence of Particularized
Repeated Visual Images Sequence of Visual Images Auditory
Without_ _____ _Visual Images Images
Variation Instantiated Partially Instantiated Partially Instantiated
Schemas and Instantiated Schemas and Instantiated Schemas and
Nonimaginal Development of Schemas and Development of Schemas and Development of
Rigid Schemas Development of Rigid Schemas Development of Rigid Schemas
SRigid Schemas (Scripts) Rigid Schemas
Repeated Imaginal Generic Visual Generic Visual Generic Audi-Imaginal'
With Images Images.. ? .? _tory Images
Variation Instantiated Schema Instantiated Instantiated
Nonimagna chemas and Development Schemas and Schemas and
chema Schema Devel- Schema
Development _____. opment (Plans) . . Development
Particularize
Auditory Imag
Partially
Instantiated
Schemas
Particularizeý
Auditory
Images
Partially
Instantiated
Development o
Rigid Schemas
Generic Audi-
tory Images
Schema
Development
Table 2 continued
Acquisition Conditions
Single
Instance
Repeated
Without
Variation
Repeated
With
Variation
TYPES OF INPUT
EMOTIONAL
SITUATIONS
LINGUISTIC
MEANINGFUL MEANINGLESS
(Expository Dis- (Surface Struc-
course) ture)
COGNITIVE
OPERATIONS
MOTOR
PERFORMANCE
PLAN
PRODUCTION
None Auditory or
Visual Images __
Facts Incomplete Sur- Incomplete Incomplete Plan Produc-
Propositions face Structure Cognitive Motor tions
Production Productions Production (Awareness of
Schemas Schemas Schemas intentions, goi
and subgoals)
None Little or Little or Little or
NoNo Imager yo magery No Imagery _____ __
Facts Surface Rigid Cogni- Rigid Motor Rigid Plans
Propositions Structure tive Produc- Production Productions
Production tion Schemas Schemas (Awareness of
Schemas intentions
and goals)
(Scripts)
None Little or Little or
No Imagery No Imagery____
Thoughts Generative Generative Plan Produc-
Cognitive Motor tion
Production Production (Awareness of
Schemas Schemas intentions
_________________and goals)


